Morality

(For previous sections see below)

Title

              God II: a God for atheists

5.  Morality and the 'Will of God'

Dawkins, in chapter 6 of 'The God Delusion', questioned the root of morality, asking 'Why are we good?' He pointed out that atheists scored as well as theists on simple mathematical tests of morality, like 'under what circumstance might you kill one person to save five?'. He argued (as have others) that altruism can have Darwinian survival value in several social contexts, making it credible that altruism has indeed evolved in social animals by natural selection, thus dispensing with the need to base morality in God. He anticipated the protest that some altruistic actions, like feeding other people's babies, have no survival value for the selfish genes that code such actions, by calling such actions 'misfirings' of the altruistic gene. The gene evolved (he would argue) in the context of an inbred clan in which a hungry baby was likely to be related to the altruistic feeder. So, to the question "Is it a supernatural God that makes us moral?" he answers "No! It is natural selection".  

I offer the following rephrasing:
"Is it a supernatural God that makes us moral? No. It is natural morality that makes us moral, but many people call it God."

I do this not simply to annoy R. Dawkins, but because I think this is a correct analysis of a very large part of religion as it has developed over the last 2000 years. The word God is composite; it contains a great number of different meanings, but in particular two meanings, which I have labelled God I and God II. To believe in a supernatural God may be a mistake; but to dismiss God as a delusion is equally a mistake. The supernatural, pre-scientific, Stone Age God (God I) may be a mistake, but there remains the concept (God II) that lies behind the moral teachings of Jesus, and innumerable other saints, and sinners, who have used the word 'God' to enshrine their concept of right and wrong. This is a humane God; and indeed a human one. To the extent that God is supposed to have a personality, is supposed to love, praise, blame, etc., in-so-far-as God talks to mankind, bids us do this or not do that, to precisely that extent God is clearly a human construct. As the word 'moral' seems to go along with words like, civilized, decent, honest, kind, true, the atheist might well hope that he can be called moral. The Dawkins-type atheist does not deny morality; he merely wishes to say it is natural, not supernatural. That position seems sound enough because it seems tautological (given that 'natural' includes 'that which is', and excludes only 'that which is not').

I doubt whether anyone can love his neighbour simply because told to do so, by Jesus or anyone else. But to be encouraged to do so may tip the balance between co-operating and competing, loving and hating. The moral atheist may feel prompted (by simple physiological mechanisms) to love his neighbour, quite as much as a Christian does. The value of the teaching "Love thy neighbour as thy self" is a subtle question of reinforcing, and bundling. It probably makes little difference to the crude impulse, that it be enjoined on us by Jesus, but it does make us aware of a tingly extra quality of goodness; it puts neighbourliness in a category with charity, self abnegation etc. Morality seems to be a diffuse bundle of feelings and teachings, which has been spoken of, by some, as the 'will of God'. To dismiss God as a delusion should never make us dismiss the diffuse bundle. It remains as important for us as when it was described as the will of God. Which is why I think it worthwhile to write this.

Life-after-death? (Heaven II and Hell II)

The immediate rewards of virtue are at best insubstantial. Virtue often goes unrewarded, and in many cases the path of virtue is extremely unpleasant. Similarly, the discomforts of a guilty conscious, though acute for a small minority, are for most people mild and can be overridden, while for a sturdy minority the discomfort seems entirely absent. Traditional Abrahamic religions have clearly realized the weakness of these internal moral forces, and have developed doctrines that seem designed to strengthen them. Thus it is a core contention of both Islam and Christianity that, after death, eventual bliss will be enjoyed by the righteous; and torments suffered by sinners.

The idea of 'life after death' seems an odd concept now-a-days, with our growing understanding of biology; no brain, no thoughts, no memories, no sensations, no pain; in other words, 'no life'. But it clearly caught the popular imagination in the Stone Age, and it is still cherished in some quarters today. It is easy to see why both reward and punishment were said to be delayed till after death. Punishment of the guilty clearly does not happen in this life with sufficient rigour to imply a just God. So, we were told to believe in delayed justice (as preferable to a patchy or whimsical justice). Furthermore, the 'after death' contention was impossible to disprove. The subsequent invention of purgatory brought the Medieval Church in Western Europe enormous wealth, playing (cynically?) upon the anxieties of sinners. Yet, even with all the hope and fear drummed into an ignorant laity, the Church found itself unable to guide the masses into the path of virtue (or obedience); so it introduced the inquisition, with its very real tortures and horrific bonfires! And still the people could not be brought to obedience. It is not my purpose, here, to criticise the priests of those dark times, who doubtless thought they were doing the sensible thing, even if they could not think it the right thing. I am simply wondering how much attention will be paid to a morality that does not teach life after death, with at least the possibility of eternal bliss or eternal pain as consequences of 'good' and 'bad' actions.

I agree with the atheists that mankind should give up the notion of a supernatural God (God I) altogether; and similarly give up the notion of life-after-death. The issues are entirely separate, for the God I concept does not imply 'life after death', and vice versa. However, the arguments are the same: "Do not try to believe the impossible", and "Do not believe (much less teach) what you do not know to be the case, merely because it appeals to you (or your listeners)". In place of God I, I am urging instead the concept of a completely different God-concept, which I am calling God II. And in place of 'life after death' with its attendant heaven and hell, I would suggest a metaphorical heaven and hell very much in this life. If to dwell in heaven is to live in the presence of God then to dwell in this 'type II Heaven' is to live in the presence of this God II. Similarly, type II Hell would be to live excluded from that presence.

How does God II reinforce morals?

One might well ask, if God II does not punish sinners and reward the virtuous after death, as is claimed of God I, will anyone pay any attention to this attenuated and rational morality? People brought up to believe in an existent God with a real physical presence (albeit supernatural) and an actual reunion after death (albeit incredible), may well find God II (and Heaven II) pointless concepts. However, I think God II, properly understood, can be an effective route to virtue; and a very much more effective support than a discredited religion. My postulated reader, who thinks he retains morals while dismissing God, will be thinking as he reads all this: "Surely I am wasting my time here!". I would reply that a morality (or a religion) that is dismissed as delusional will be far less use than this one that painstakingly searches for its own moral perceptions and also for those of fellow human beings; one that shares, and incorporates the accrued perceptions of generations of moral predecessors. Further than that, I would suggest that it is a sine qua non of a moral life to make this painstaking investigation, to do this sharing, and to respect the accretion that results.

Virtue has been said to be its own reward; said so often, indeed, that we do not pause to think what it means. The phrase is often used to explain the scant thanks with which kindness is often greeted, but there is more truth in the saying than this sardonic usage. For there is indeed a reward experienced in yielding to a generous impulse; and a ten-fold greater pleasure in being the witness of another's kindness. That latter pleasure is equivalent to type II bliss; the parallel is exact; you would be living in the presence of goodness.

Sartre suggested, in his play "Huis clos", that "Hell is other people". He may be right, but then (according to me) so is Heaven.